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INVESTORS' RIGHTS: THE EVOLUTIONARY PROCESS OF
INVESTMENT TREATIES
David R. Adair
I. INTRODUCTION
The individual investor is often more susceptible to a greater amount
of risk when investing in foreign markets than customarily experienced in
domestic markets. Often this risk factor includes the inability of the in-
vestor to take legal action against the state if a conflict arises in the
course of business. In order to understand the position of the domestic
investor against the international state, one must look to a series of trea-
ties and agreements that the United States has entered into with various
international partners. This is necessary because no single comprehensive
set of multilateral rules currently exists for the regulation of foreign direct
investment! The origin or these agreements addressing foreign direct
investment date back to the founding of the United States. Thus, in order
to fully comprehend these agreements the investor must examine them in
their historical context and track the evolution of the empowerment of the
individual investor.
The framework of this paper follows three timeframes. The first are
those agreements which are Pre-North American Free Trade Agreement
(hereinafter Pre-NAFTA).2 The second stage is the North American Free
Trade Agreement (hereinafter NAFTA), which has elevated the status of
the individual investor on the world stage. The third stage is the Multilat-
eral Agreement on Investment (hereinafter MAI).3 The MAI is the most
I. See Eric M. Burt, Developing Countries and The Framework For Negotiations on
Foreign Direct investment In The World Trade Organization, 12 AM. U. J. INT'L L & POL'Y
1015,1016 (1997).
2. North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 8 and 17, 1992 U.S.-Can.-Mex., 1993;
The implementing legislation is found in the North American Free Trade Agreement Imple-
mentation Act, Pub. L 103-182, 107 Stat. 2057 (1993). (Free trade agreements are not self-
executing treaties. They are entered into by the President and require Congressional approval
of implementing legislation before they become law in the U.S. The implementing legislation
incorporates the trade agreement under consideration and, if not disapproved by Congress,
becomes federal law. The approval process is delineated in the Omnibus Trade and Com-
petitiveness Act of 1988, 19 U.S.C. 2902-2903 (1988).
3. Multilateral Agreement on Investment: Consolidated Text and Commentary, Negoti-
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recent and far reaching in the regulation of foreign direct investment.
Therefore, to date, the MAI is the most ambitious proposal to address the
subject of international investment.
A. The Pre-NAFTA Investment Agreements
Upon the founding of the United States, it was felt that a legal system
was needed to establish commercial relations with other nations. The re-
sult of the initiative was the Friendship, Commerce and Navigation
Treaty (hereinafter FCN).4 The FCN was the first step in the evolutionary
process of the regulation of investment. The early FCNs proposed general
obligations to protect the property of the nationals of the other party; in-
cluded were provisions on the subjects of expropriation and repatriation
of earnings.' In the 1920's and 1930's, foreign commercial relations be-
gan to expand, and the FCN became the primary treaty instrument for the
protection for foreign investments.6 The result of this use of FCNs as the
primary instrument was more comprehensive protections for foreign in-
vestment.7 Included in FCNs were guarantees of prompt, adequate and
effective compensation for the expropriation of property.8 Any breach of
these modem FCNs could be addressed through pre-existing legal reme-
dies in the treaties' provisions and submitted to the International Court of
Justice (hereinafter ICJ).'
The FCNs were the first treaties to address foreign investment, but
were they are far from acceptable for the risk adverse investor. The ICJ
upheld necessary protections established in U.S.-Italy FCN, which sup-
ported state standing, on behalf of its nationals."0 In the Barcelona Trac-
ating Group on the MAI, Directorate for Financial, Fiscal and Enterprise Affairs, Org. for
Econ. Cooperation and Dev., OECD Doc. DAFFE/MAI (97)l/REV2 (September 14, 1998).
Also available at <http://www.citizen.org/gtw/mainewte.htm> [hereinafter MAI Agreement].
4. FCN refers to all bilateral commercial treaties, negotiated by the United States prior to
the beginning of the bilateral investment treaty program. See KENNETH VANDEVELDE,
UNTED STATES INvESTMENT TREATIES 15 (1992). Today, FCNs remain in force with Argen-
tina, Austria, Belgium, Bolivia, Brunei, Columbia, Costa Rica, Denmark, Estonia, Ethiopia,
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Honduras, India. Iran, Iraq, Ireland. Israel, Italy, Japan,
Korea, Latvia, Liberia, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malta, Morocco, Nepal, the Netherlands,
Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Paraguay, Saudi Arabia, Spain, Suriname, Switzerland, Taiwan,
Thailand, Togo, Turkey, the United Kingdom, Vietnam, Yemen, and Yugoslavia. See 20
l.L.M. 565 (1981).
5. See VANDELVELDE, supra note 4, at 16.
6. Id. at 17.
7. See Christopher N. Camponovo, Dispute Settlement and the OECD Multilateral
Agreement On Investment, 1 UCLA J. INT'L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 186 (1996).
8. See VANDEVELDE, supra note 4, at 19.
9. See, e.g., Treaty of Friendship, Feb. 2, 1948, U.S.-Italy, art. XXVI, 12 U.S.T. 131.
10. See Wendy Huey, International Litigation: United States and Italy FCN Treaty and
LCJ. Jurisdiction Over Disputes--United States v. Italy 1989 IC.J. 15 (1989), 32 HARV.
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tion (Belgium v. Spain), the ICJ rejected Italy's claims that neither the
U.S.-Italy FCN or the Treaty Supplement extended shareholders any
more rights than those established by customary law." While an investor
may be able to take some value out of this decision, it must be remem-
bered that an investor is without the ability to take claim directly against
the state in an investor-to-state dispute. 2 The prospects for an investor
relying on the resolution alternative provided for in FCNs are less than
desirable.' 3 While the FCN provides a solid foundation for the issue of
foreign investment, it must be remembered that the FCN is the first treaty
in the evolutionary process.
The second of the Pre-NAFTA investment agreements is the Bilat-
eral Investment Treaty (hereinafter BIT).14 Initiated in the 1960s, the BIT
was created to provide a stable international legal framework for the
regulation of direct foreign investment. The BIT, like the FCNs, pro-
vides obligations that cover numerous areas, including: (1) Most Favored
Nation treatment;' 6 (2) expropriation and nationalization of investment; 7
(3) transfer of capital;" (4) performance requirements; 1" and (5) dispute
resolution.2'
The BIT is similar to the FCN in allowing state-state dispute resolu-
tion. However, unlike the FCN, the BIT establishes arbitrators for the
resolution of conflict between states.2 A major difference between the
FCN and the BIT is that a national citizen or company has the ability to
INT'L L J. 236 (1991), Sean D. Murphy, The ELS! Case; An Investment Dispute at the Inter-
national Court of Justice, 16 YALE J. INT'L L 391 (1991).
11. See Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 34 (1) which states that "[o]nly
states may be parties in cases before the Court."
12. Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 34 ("only states maybe parties in
cases before the Court.")
13- See Camponovo, supra note 7, at 189-190.
14. See Jeswald W. Salacuse, BIT by BIT: The Growth of Bilateral Investment Treaties
and Their Impact on Foreign Investment in Developing Countries, 24 INT'L LAW. 655
(1990). The first bilateral investment treaty was signed in 1959 between West Germany and
Pakistan. Treaty for the Protection of Investment, Nov. 25, 1959, FR.G.-Pak., 457 U.N.T.S.
23.
15. See id. at 657.
16. With respect to this obligation, BITs negotiated by the United States create stricter
obligations than do BITs of other OECD nations. The U.S. Model BIT requires national or
MFN treatment at all stages of investment, from pre-establishment through divestment,
whereas other BITs only require national or MFN treatment post-establishment. 1987 U.S.
Model BIT at art. II.
17. See id. at art. III, para. 1.
18. See id. at art. IV, para. 1.
19. See id. at art. II.
20. See id. at art. VI.
21. See Camponovo, supra note 7, at 193 (citing 1994 U.S. Model BIT at art IX).
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present a conflict "arising out of or relating to an investment authoriza-
tion, an investment agreement or an alleged breach of any right conferred,
created or recognized by [the] treaty." 2 If an investor should choose to
take a state to arbitration, the following forums would be available for
adjudication: (1) the International Centre for the Settlement of Investment
Disputes (hereinafter ICSID),23 (2) the ICSID Additional Facility;24 (3) in
accordance with the Arbitration Rules of the United Nations Commission
on International Trade Law; or (4) if agreed by both parties, to any other
arbitration institution or in accordance with any other arbitration rules. 5
If an investor pursues the arbitration option the matter may not be pur-
sued in the local courts; likewise if the investor takes action in the local
courts, the matter may not be adjudicated through international arbitra-
tion.26
The BIT has been an improvement over the FCN in providing an
avenue for investor-state disputes. This instrument has proven effective in
both establishing substantive guidelines for the protection of foreign in-
vestment and in providing an effective framework for the resolution of
disputes.27 The BIT is an example of how agreements on investment have
continued to evolve for the betterment of the investor.
The third of the Pre-NAFTA investment agreements is the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (hereinafter GATT).2 ' The GATT treaty
did not fully address the subject of foreign direct investment, until the
Uruguay Round. The Uruguay Round produced twenty-two principal
instruments (twenty-one agreements and one Understanding) plus the
22. See id. Under the FCN, states are obligated to accord the citizens of the other party
national or MFN treatment with regard to access to local courts. This obligation allows for
litigation of any investment claim before the courts of one's host state.
23. See id. (citing MOSHE HIRSCH, THE ARBITRATION MECHANISM OFTHE INTERNATIONAL
CENTRE FOR THE SETTLEMENT OF INVESTMENT DISPUTES (1993); David A. Soley, ICSID
Implementation: An Effective Alternative to International Conflict, 19 INT'L LAW. 521
(1985)). CSID established binding guidelines under which a nation and a foreign national
may prefer to settle any claims. See Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes
between States and Nationals of Other States, Mar. 19, 1965, 17 U.S.T. 1270.
24. See id. (citing Rules Governing the Additional Facility for the Administration of Pro-
ceedings by the Secretariat of the International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Dis-
putes, reprinted in 21 .LM. 1443, 1445 (1982). "The Additional Facility was initiated in
1978 as an avenue for disputes that are outside the jurisdiction of the Centre." See id.
25. See id. (citing 1994 U.S, Model BIT at art. IX. See also, 1987 U.S. Model BIT, supra
note 2, art. VII.
26. See id.
27. See amponovo, supra note 7, at 194 (citing Paul Peters, Dispute Settlement Arrange-
ments in Investment Treaties, 22 NETH. Y.B. INT'L. L. 91, 93 (1991).
28. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 55 U.N.T.S. 188 [hereinafter
GATT].
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associated Ministerial Decisions and Declarations. - There are three
agreements that were negotiated at the Uruguay Round, that are of par-
ticular concern for the investor. These agreements are the Agreements on
Trade-Related Investment Measures (hereinafter TRIMs),0, the General
Agreement on Trade in Services (hereinafter GATS)3' and the Agreement
on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual property Rights (hereinafter-
TRIPS) 2.
The TRIMs agreement was among the new provisions established at
the Uruguay Round. This agreement is restricted to trade in goods, but
establishes notification, transparency, national treatment, and the phased
elimination of TRIMs." A TRIM is any host country investment restric-
tion that affects the making or operation of an investment; a TRIM either
restricts imports or exports.34 The TRIMs agreement is only a cautious
first step toward the regulation and liberalization of direct investment; it
is not a comprehensive investment agreement.3' The TRIMs agreement is
void of a provision for the repatriation of capital36, expropriation and
compensation issues"'. An important achievement of the TRIMs agree-
ment is the establishment in Article 9 of a review of the agreement within
five years31. This review provision could provide built-in authority for
negotiating the possible expansion of the World Trade Organization's
coverage of direct investment.39
29. Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Nego-
tiations, April 15, 1994, reprinted in THE RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF
MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS (GATT Secretariat 1994). Portions of the Final Act
also appear in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade; Multilateral Trade Negotiations
Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations,
April 15, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1125.
30. 3 THE GATT URUGUAY ROUND: A NEGOTIATING HISTORY (1986-1992), at 700,
(Terence P. Stewart ed., 1993).
31. General Agreement on Trade in Services, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Es-
tablishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1B, Legal Instruments-Results of the
Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M. 1168 (1994).
32. GATT, supra note 30, at 851. See also, Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of In-
tellectual Property Rights, Including Trade in Counterfeit Goods (1993).
33. Thomas L Brewer, International Dispute Settlement Procedures: The Evolving Re-
gimeffor Foreign Investment, 26 LAW & PLO'Y INT'L Bus. 633, 645 (1995).
34. See Paul Ryan Christy III, Negotiation Investment in the GATf: A Call for Function-
alism, 12 MICH. J. INT'L L 743, 779 (1991).
35- See DANIEL M. PRICE & BRYAN CHRISTY II, AGREEMENT ON TRADE RELATED
INVESTMENT MEASURES (TRIMS): LIMITATIONS AND PROSPECTS FOR THE FUTURE, in THE
WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION: THE MULTILATERAL TRADE FRAMEWORK FOR THE 2 1 ST
CENTURY AND U. S. IMPLEMENTING LEGISLATION 439, 453 (Terence P. Stewart ed., 1996).
36. See Id.
37. See Id.
38. See Brewer, supra note 33, at 644.
39. See World Trade Organization Secretariat, Singapore Ministerial Declaration, para. 20
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Many consider the GATS the true investment agreement of the Uru-
guay Round.' The GATS agreement includes foreign direct investment
within the scope of its application by defining trade in services to contain
the supply of a service "by a service supplier of one Member, through
commercial presence in the territory of any other Member."'" The phrase
"commercial presence" is defined to mean "any type of business or pro-
fessional establishment, including through (i) the constitution, acquisition
or maintenance of a judicial person, or (ii) the creation or maintenance of
a branch or a representative office, within the territory of a member for
the purpose of supplying a service."'4 Topics covered by provisions in the
GATS agreement include: notification, transparency, most favored nation
treatment, national treatment, market access, subsidies, and foreign ex-
change restrictions on capital account and current account transactions. 3
The GATS agreement is another attempt at the softening of regula-
tion of foreign direct investment. The overall effect of GATS on the lib-
eralization of foreign direct investment is limited. One achievement of the
GATS agreement is contained in Article XIX. In Article XIX the re-
quirement of a review of the agreement by the year 2000 seems to ensure
the broadening of the agreement powers."
Wt/MIN(96)/DEC (adopted on 13 Dec. 1996), reprinted in Singapore Ministerial Declara-
tion, WTO Focus (World Trade Organization, Geneva, Switzerland), Jan. 1997, at 7, 10.
Concerning direct investment and the WTO framework, the Ministers stated, "[h]aving re-
gard to the existing WTO provision on matters related to investment and competition policy
and the built-in agenda in these areas, including under the TRIM agreement, and on the un-
derstanding that the work undertaken shall not prejudge [whether] negotiations will be initi-
ated in the future, we also agree to: establish a working group to examine the relationship
between trade and investment .... In the conduct of the work of the working groups, we
encourage cooperation with the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development to...
ensure that the development dimension is taken fully into account .... It is clearly under-
stood that future negotiations, if any, regarding multilateral disciplines in these areas, will
take place only after an explicit consensus decision is taken among WTO members regarding
such negations."
40. See Investment and the Final Act of the Uruguay Round: A Preliminary Stocktaking,
OECD Trade Directorate at 6, OECD Doe. COM/TD/DAFFE/IMF(94)56/REEV 1 (1994)
(arguing that the GATS "contains the single largest number of investment-related provi-
sions" of the Uruguay Round agreements). See also Price & Christy, supra note 35, at 454
(considering the OATS the WTO's "real investment agreement").
41. 1 Law & Practice of the World Trade Organization., at 341, 342 (Joseph F. Dennin
ed., 1995) General Agreement on Trade in Services, art. 1 (2) (C) [hereinafter 1 Law & Prac-
tice].
42. Id. at 363.
43- See Brewer, supra note 33, at 644.
44- See 1 Law & Practice, supra note 41, at 358. See GATS Agreement pt. IV. art. XIX
(providing for review of GATS within five years from the date of its entry into force, 1995).
The TRIMS agreement also provides for its review within five years and how together with
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The third provision of relevance for investors under the Uruguay
Rounds is the TRIPs agreement. This agreement provides protection for
the distribution of technology through foreign direct investment opera-
tions. 5 This is crucial to foreign direct investors; often investment proj-
ects include international technology transfers between firms and their
foreign affiliates. 6 The definition of intellectual property is defined to
include "copyrights, trademarks, industrial designs, patents, and the lay-
out designs of integrated circuits."'47
Under the expanded GATT/WTO framework, any dispute concern-
ing foreign direct investment is subject to the Understand of Rules and
Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (hereinafter DSU).'
The DSU covers the TRIMS, GATS, and the TRIPs agreements.'
The Pre-NAFTA treaties offer a foundation for the regulation of for-
eign direct investment. The FCNs, BITs, and the various GATT agree-
ments provided future agreements with basic provisions that are initial
components of what would be needed in future agreements. The FCN
established the need for regulation of foreign direct investment and in its
fundamental provision exposed the complexity of the issue. The BITs
expand upon the FCN, but were only binding upon the two signatory par-
ties of the agreement. The BITS were crucial in the introduction of the
investor-to-state arbitration settlement, but this revision was narrow in
applicability and insufficient for the demands of the international busi-
ness community. GATT, the final of the three pre-NAFTA agreements,
began to approach the coverage needed for modem regulation of foreign
direct investment, but did not expand the ability of the individual investor
to protect their investment via a substantive investor-to-state dispute
resolution mechanism. These shortcomings of the pre-NAFfA agree-
ments would soon be addressed in the next phases of this evolutionary
process.
II. NAFTA: A CLEAR PROTECTION FOR THE INVESTOR
The second stage of the regulation of foreign direct investment is
governed by the well-known NAFTA agreement. NAFTA expands upon
the GATTS five-year review provision this represents built-in authority for negotiating the
possible expansion of WTO coverage of foreign direct investment.
45. See Burt, supra note 1, at 1039.
46. See Brewer, supra note 33, at 644.
47. Id.
48. 2 THE GATT URUGUAY ROUND: A NEGOTIATING HISTORY (1986-1992), at 2794
(Terence P. Stewart ed., 1993). Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Set-
tlement of Disputes under Articles XXII and XXIII of the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade.
49. See Brewer, supra note 33, at 645.
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the fundamental provisions established in the FCN, BIT and GATT
agreements. Although NAFTA is restricted to the signatory parties of the
United States, Canada and Mexico, the agreement provides for the most
aggressive investor-state dispute resolution settlement provisions to date.
The signatory parties provided rules for trade, investment, and the
provision of services created NAFTA. It was felt that the implementa-
tion of NAFTA would create a free trade zone and reduce trade barriers,
and preserve the parties' ability to remain competitive in the world mar-
ket.51 To ensure the success of the NAFTA agreement, the signatory par-
ties understood that the issue of foreign direct investment needed to be
addressed. The United States directly invested sixty-eight billion dollars
into Canada and sixteen billion dollars into Mexico in 1992.2 Due to in-
creasing amounts of foreign direct investment between the signatory par-
ties, the NAFTA agreement in Chapter 11 covers investment. Chapter 11
has three basic objectives:
[1] establish a secure investment environment through the elaboration of clear
rules of fair treatment of foreign investment and investors; [21 remove barriers
to investment by eliminating or liberalizing existing restrictions; and [31] pro-
vide an effective means for the resolution of disputes between and investor and
the host government.53
Chapter 11 of the NAFTA agreement may have been one of the
overlooked provisions of the NAFTA agreement, but from an investors
standpoint, it may be one of the single most influential documents for
years to come.
Chapter 11 of the NAFTA agreement is composed of two parts: Sec-
tion A and B. These sections apply to all governmental measures relating
to investment, with the exception of measures governing financial serv-
50. See Noemi Gal-Or, Private Party Direct Access: A Comparison of the NAFTA and the
EU Disciplines, 21 BOSTON COLLEGE INT'LCOMP. L REV. 1,5 (1998).
51. See Jonathan I. Miller, Comment, Prospects for Satisfactory Dispute Resolution of
Private Commercial Disputes Under the North American Free Trade Agreement, 21 PEPP. L
REV. 1314-1315 (1994).
52. See SIDNEY WEINTRAUB, NAFTA: WHAT COMES NEXT? 43 (1994) (citing "U.S. Di-
rect Investment Abroad: Detail for Historical-Cost Position and Balance of Payments Flows,
1992," Survey of Current Business 73, no. 7 (July 1993): 100.) Relying upon Table 3-5,
Weintraub states that "[tihe U.S. Department of Commerce figures for Foreign Direct In-
vestment in Mexico seem low, in part because of the historical-cost measurement technique."
Weintraub futher states that, "[t]he U.S. embassy in Mexico reports the cumulative level of
U.S. Foreign Direct Investment in 1992 as $23 billion, or $10 billion more than shown in
table 3-5." Id.
53. Daniel M. Price, An Overview of the NAFTA Investment Chapter: Substantive Rules
and Investor-State Dispute Settlement. 27 INT'L. LAW. 727 (1993).
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ices, which are governed by Chapter 14. Section A, sets forth the obliga-
tions of the parties and designates the beneficiaries of this chapter. Bene-
ficiaries of the chapter are "citizens, permanent resident aliens and other
designated persons of the signatory parties. '5 4 The broad scope of Section
A also refers to all enterprises "' constituted or organized' under Cana-
dian, Mexican or United States law."55 Practically every entity imaginable
is covered including "corporations, partnerships, trusts, sole proprietor-
ships, joint ventures and associations."56
The definition of investment is very inclusive in article 1139 of the
NAFrA agreement. Covered under the definition of investment are
stocks, bonds, loans, income, profit or asset interest, real estate, tangible
or intangible, business property, turnkey or construction contracts, com-
pressions, and licensing and franchising contracts. 7 Under the NAFTA
agreement, treatment of investors and investment are provided important
protections.s These articles entail among other things, the same treatment
as given to nationals, regarding the "established acquisition, expansion,
management, conduct, operation, and sale or other disposition of invest-
ments." An intention of the articles of the agreement is to eliminate dis-
crimination against NAFTA investors and investments. This is achieved
by Article 1102, which bars government quotas on equity holding by na-
tionals. ' Secondly, to discourage discrimination, there cannot be any law
in place that requires the reservation of senior management positions to
individuals of any particular nationality. 6 Section A of Chapter 11 also
entails others areas including, but not limited to, standards of treatment,
performance requirements, transfers, expropriation and compensation,
denial of benefits, and environmental measures. 62
54. RALPH FOLSOM & W. DAVIS FOLSOM, UNDERSTANDING NAFTA AND ITS
INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS IMPLICATIONS 189 (1997) (citing NAFTA at Annex 201.1).
55. Id. (citing NAFTA at Annex 201).
56. FOLSOM & FOLSOM, supra note 54, at 189.
57. See id. (citing NAFTA at art. 1139).
58. See id.
59. FOLSOM & FOLSOM, supra note 54, at 189 (citing NAFIA at art. 1102).
60. OCEAN PUBLICATIONS, INC., NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENTS: TREATY
MATERIALS Art. 1102 (James R. Holbein and Donald J. Musch eds., Booklet 3 1994).
[hereinafter Ocean Pub. Booklet 3, 1994].
61. See id. at art. 1107.
62. See id. at arts. 1104-1114. Exceptions to the rules include: "Annex I lists existing
measures of a Party that derogate from the national treatment, MFN [most favored nation], or
performance requirement obligations. Measures listed in this annex are subject to the so-
called "ratchet rule": a measure may not be made more restrictive and, if liberalized, may not
later be made more restrictive. Annex II lists sectors such as maritime and basic telecommu-
nications that are not subject to the ratchet rule. Annex III lists Mexico's constitutionally
based exceptions. These exceptions are subject to the ratchet rule. In addition, any foreign
investment that is or may be pennitted in a constitutionally reserved sector will receive the
1999]
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Section B of Chapter 1 1 of the NAFTA agreement has been called
"the part of NAFTA that no one has read (or understood), the most im-
portant part of NAFTA. .. "' Some commentators feel this way about
Section B for very valid reasons. This section provides the individual in-
vestor with the ability to seek arbitration against the state for any breach
of an existing obligation.' This article of the agreement is similar to the
investor-state dispute settlement provision of the BIT.' Section B allows
for arbitration for claims covered by Section A of Chapter 1 1.
The right of the investor to bring action against the state and have
standing is known as locus standi. The signatory parties of NAFTA ac-
cepted these obligations to submit disputes to arbitration under the
agreement terms.' The investor-state provisions encompass:
(1) actions taken by federal, state, and provincial governments; (2) certain ac-
tions taken by state enterprises; and (3) actions taken by certain state chartered
monopolies when actions are inconsistent with the NAFTA agreement. 67
These articles are subject to reservations set forth within the agree-
ment. For an investor to bring a claim against the state, the claim must be
brought within a three-year statute of limitations window.' This time
begins to run from the date on which the investor first acquired, or should
have first acquired, knowledge of the alleged breach and knowledge that
the investor has incurred loss or damage.' An investor who is submitting
a claim to arbitration must provide the other party with notice at least
ninety days before the claim is submitted.7" If a single investor should
take action under the agreement, one must waive in writing the ability to
benefits of the chapter. Annex IV lists sectors and certain agreements that are excluded from
the scope of the most favored nation obligation." See Price, supra note 53, at 730-31.
63. Matthew Nolan & Darin Lippoldt, Obscure NAFTA Clause Empowers Private Parties,
TItENAT'L L J., April 6, 1998, at B8.
64. FOLSOM & FOLSOM, supra note 54, at 194. Mexico has often refused to arbitration in
foreign investment disputes, citing the Calvo Doctrine. This doctrine requires that foreigners
forfeit protection by their national governments and submit any legal claims to the courts of
Mexico. See supra note 54.
65. NOLAN & LIPPOLDT, supra note 63, at B8.
66. FOLSOM & FOLSOM, supra note 54, at 195.
67. PRICE, supra note 53, at 732
68. FOLSOM & FOLSOM, supra note 54, at 195.
69. See id.
70. See id. (citing NAFTA at art. 1119). (Other items to be included in the notice in-
clude: 1) the name and address of the disputing investor and, where a claim is made under
Article 1117, the name and address of the enterprise; 2) the provisions of the agreement
alleged to have been breached and any other relevant provisions; 3) the issues and the factual
basis for the claim; and 4) the relief sought and the approximate amount of damages
claimed.) See id.
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take any other proceedings regarding the same claim.7'
Any arbitration covered by Chapter 11 can be submitted under: (1)
the ICSID Convention, provided that both the disputing party and the
party of the investor are parties to the Convention; (2) the Additional Fa-
cility Rules of ICSID, provided that either the disputing party or the party
of the investor, but not both, is a party to the ICSID Convention; or (3)
the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules.72 A NAFTA investment arbitration
tribunal is composed of three individuals, two of whom are selected by
the opposing parties, and a third presiding arbitrator who is appointed by
agreement of the disputing parties." If the disputing parties cannot decide
on a presiding arbitrator within ninety days and submitting the claim, the
Secretary-General will appoint a presiding arbitrator from a roster of pre-
viously approved arbitrators.74
A NAFTA investment arbitration tribunal has a reasonable amount
of flexibility in awarding damages to an investor. A tribunal may order an
interim measure of protection to preserve the rights of a disputing party,
or to ensure that the tribunal's jurisdiction is made fully effective, in-
cluding an order to preserve evidence in the possession or control of a
disputing party or to protect the tribunal's jurisdiction.75 If a tribunal
should award damages to an investor, that award can take the form of
monetary damages and applicable interest or restitution of property.76 If
unable to comply, the losing party may pay monetary damages and inter-
est in lieu of restitution." Often the enforcement of an award is the most
difficult part of the any legal process, but the NAFTA agreement pro-
vides that an investor may not seek enforcement of award for 120 days
from the date of the award." If a party fails to comply with the award of
the tribunal, an investor may engage an arbitration panel under Chapter
20 of NAFrA, to render an opinion on compliance of the award.79 It is
possible under Chapter 20 that the investor's state could suspend benefits
granted under NAFTA to the party in non-compliance.8"
The importance of the provisions of Chapter 11 of the NAFTA
71. See id. at 195. (Included are administrative and judicial proceedings. Investors do not
waive their rights to injunctive, declaratory or other extraordinary relief not involving dam-
ages, because these remedies cannot be awarded through NAFTA arbitration). See id.
72. See Ocean Pub. Booklet 3, 1994, supra note 60 at art. 1120 (Only the United States
currently adheres to the ICSID).
73. See id. at art. 1123.
74- See id. at art. 1124.
75- See Id. at art. 1134.
76- See id. at art. 1135.
77. See id. at art. 1135. (A tribunal may not order a partyto pay punitive damages).
78. Ocean Pub. Booklet 3, 1994, supra note 60 at art.1136.
79. Id.
80. FOLSOM, supra note 54, at 197-198.
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agreement cannot be underestimated, but the practical experiences of
claims brought under these provisions must be examined to give the in-
vestor a complete picture of the process. Since the implementation of the
NAFIA agreement, there have been three claims brought under the pro-
visions of Chapter 11." These claims are all being pursued by investors
against the respective states, who are parties to the NAFTA agreement.
The final decisions of the cases are not yet available, but the nature and
development of these claims provide the investor with insight into Chap-
ter 11 disputes.
The first of these cases was initiated by three individuals, who are
the principals of the company, Desechos Solidos de Naucalpan (herein-
after Desona).' This California based business successfully bid upon and
entered into a 15-year contract with the city of Naucalpan de Juarez. 3
Desona was to provide management of a solid-waste landfill, until the
Naucalpan county council nullified the contract after it was signed. 4
Desona claimed that $3 million was spent in the negotiation and bidding
of the contract.85 The company alleged that the city of Naucalpan de
Juarez breached the contract and "appropriated" the business in violation
of Chapter 11 .6 The arbitration heard the dispute on September 26,
1997.7
The second case to be brought forth under Chapter 11 of the NAFTA
agreement was initiated by Metalclad Corporation (hereinafter Metal-
clad), a Newport Beach, California company. 8 Metalclad, a hazardous-
waste disposal company, filed this complaint against Mexico, on January
2, 1997.89 This is an unusual case because Metalclad was reluctant to pur-
sue the claim for various reasons (as it is often prudent to avoid disputes
in international business transactions).' Company officials did not take
action based on conduct of the Mexican national government officials;
81. See Nolan & Lippoldt, supra note 63.
82. See id.
83. See id.
84. See id.
85. See id.
86. See id.
87. See Nolan & Lippoldt, supra note 63. (The tribunal consists of Benjamin R. Civilette,
former Attorney General of the United States, Claus Von Wobeser Hoepfner, of Mexico, and
Jan Paulsson, of France, who presides.)
88. See id.
89. See id.
90. Mark Thompson, O.C. Firm Applies for Investment Protection, LA. DAILY J., Jan. 29,
1998, at Al. (Metalclad operates facilities in eight Mexican states. Metalclad waited to file
its NAFTA dispute until the last day of a three-year statute of limitations that would have
barred some of the company's claims. Company officials met with Mexican trade officials,
ambassadors, and cabinet ministers, trying every political and diplomatic avenue possible.)
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instead, the actions of Mexican State governor Horacio Sanchez Uncueta
were the grounds for the complaint.9 In 1995, former Governor Sanchez
ordered state police officers to prevent the opening of a fully approved
Metalclad facility. 92 Metalclad now alleges under Chapter 11 of the
NAFTA agreement, that Mexico, by the actions of former Governor San-
chez, illegally expropriated the hazardous waste landfill, which is prop-
erty of the company.93 According to Clyde Pearce, a lawyer for Metal-
clad, the defense "is claiming that it followed some normal procedures"
in canceling the project.94 Mr. Pearce states "even if it did, that doesn't
matter because those procedures violate the guarantees of NAFTA. Under
the provisions in the agreement, it is Mexico that pays for these vari-
ances, not the investor."'95 Metalclads $90 million claim for damages, in-
cludes fair-market value of the landfill and compensation for lost revenue
since being blocked in 1995.96 In the summer of 1997, Metalclad pre-
sented 1200 pages of material to the arbitration tribunal that contained the
facts on which complaint is based.97 In response, Mexico failed to meet
the original due date of January 1998, but successfully requested an ex-
tension until February 17, 1998.98 Metalclad chief executive officer Grant
Kesler feels that Mexico could suffer, if Metalclad should lose the case.
Kesler stated, "[i]f we get screwed, who else is going to take the risk of
going down there?"' Mr. Kesler is confident that Metalclad would be
able to collect on any award by the tribunal because "we have the right to
attach Mexican assets in the United States, which would include their
account at the World Bank. There is no way to avoid paying a NAFTA
award. ''""u This whole dispute could have been avoided, according to Mr.
Kesler, except for the actions of "a single Mexican governor."'"' Kesler
91. See id.
92. See id. (Governor Sanchez took this action, after he had declared the site an ecological
preserve.)
93. NOLAN & LIPPOLDT, supra note 63.
94. THOMPSON, supra note 90, at A10.
95. Id.
96. See NOLAN & LIPPOLDT, supra note 63.
97. See THOMPSON, supra note 90, at A10. (This claim is pending before the International
Center for the Settlement of Investment Disputes, which is specified by NAFTA as a forum
for resolving disputes. The tribunal is composed of former U.S. Attorney General Benjamin
Civiletti, chosen by Metalclad, Jose Luis Zacaros, a Mexican jurist chosen by the Mexican
government, and Elihu Lauterpacht, a law professor at Cambridge University, who was
agreed upon by both sides.)
98. See NOLAN & LIPPOLDT, supra note 63. (Because Mexico failed to timely file certain
translations of portions of its response, Metalclad had asked the tribunal to rule on this issue
before determining the need for further pleadings).
99. Thompson, supra note 90, at Al.
100. Id. at Al, A10.
101. Id. at A10.
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further noted that "the defendant has to be the government of Mexico and
not this particular state or the individual governor.""° While the Metal-
clad dispute is yet to be decided, it is clear that the investor in this situa-
tion feels confident of the investor-state provision provided within Chap-
ter 11 of NAFTA. The Metalclad case could be an example for investor
to follow, if they should find themselves in a similar situation.
The third claim to be alleged under Chapter 11 of the NAFTA
agreement is Ethyl Corporation dispute. The Ethyl Corporation (herein-
after Ethyl) of Richmond, Virginia, initiated proceedings under Chapter
11 of NAFTA against the Canadian government.' The process began in
April 1997, when the Canadian Parliament decided to ban the import and
inter-provincial transport of the gasoline additive MMT. ° Ethyl filed its
case on April 14, 1997, and is seeking at least $250 million in damages."05
Ethyl is the only manufacturer of MMT, which is produced in the United
States and processed in Canada by a Canadian subsidiary of Ethyl."°e
Only after the refusal by the United States Trade Representatives office to
pursue the claim under the governmental dispute resolution system of
NAFTA, did Ethyl decide to pursue this claim under the investor-state
dispute mechanism in Chapter 11 of NAFTA °7 Ethyl, in the allegation,
equates the ban on MMT to illegal expropriation, thus justifies the need
for compensation for actual and future earnings losses, including damage
to the corporate image.'08 It is the company's position that the action by
the Canadian government is a violation of Ethyl's investment rights and
reduces the company to an inferior position of Canadian companies."
102. Id.
103. See Ruth Abramson, Paying the Polluters?, MACLEANS, Sept. 1, 1997.
104. See Michelle Sforza & Mark Vallianatos, Ethyl Corporation v. Government of Can-
ada: Chemical Firm Uses Trade Pact to Contest Environment Law, Preamble Center Brief-
ing Paper. See http://www.rtk.net/preamble. (MMT is a manganese-based compound added
to gasoline to enhance octane and reduce engine knocking. Canadian legislators were con-
cerned that the manganese in MMT emissions posed a significant public health risk. Fur-
thermore, automobile manufacturers have argued for many years that MMT damages emis-
sions diagnostics and control equipment in cars, which increases fuel emissions in general.
The Environmental Defense Fund has reported that this additive is only used in Canada. The
United States EPA has banned its use in reformulated gasoline, which includes approxi-
mately 1/3 of the U.S. gasoline market. California has imposed a total ban on MMT).
105. Nolan & Lippoldt. supra note 63.
106. Id.
107. Testimony of Lori Wallach, Congressional Hearing on MAI, March 5, 1998. (Lori
Wallach is the director of Public Citizen's Global Trade Watch, a national consumer group
founded in 1971 by Ralph Nader.) (visited Feb. 8, 1999)
<http:www.citizen.org/pctrade/MAI/What%20is/maitest.htm>.
108. See Sforza & Vallianatos, supra note 104, at 2.
109. See Nolan & Lippoldt, supra note 63. (The ban will completely eliminate Ethyl's
Canadian business.)
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The Ethyl case is seeking the largest amount of damages ever under
Chapter 11 of NAFTA. This case should establish several precedents
when finally adjudicated by a tribunal. Such potential important prece-
dent includes the definition of expropriation and the granting of possibly
the largest award ever under Chapter 11 of NAFTA.
The NAFTA agreements were conclusively a major step in the proc-
ess of regulation of foreign direct investment. While NAFTA is only re-
stricted to the three signatory parties, it's revolutionary approach and suc-
cesses provide a framework for future investment agreements. The indi-
vidual investor received unparalleled empowerment in the ability to take
claim against the breaching state under Chapter 11 of NAFrA. As evi-
denced by the previously mentioned cases, the individual investors are
now able to take claim against the state, which is a substantial move in
providing the necessary security for foreign direct investment. The
NAFTA agreement goes beyond all previous investment treaties and un-
knowingly foreshadows the future of investment treaties.
III. MAI: THE MOST RECENT OF THE INVEsTMENT AGREEMENTS
The final stage of the evolutionary empowerment of the individual
investor is still in the drafting and negotiating stages. A majority of this
new treaty has been settled upon and drafted by the different states, which
are intending to be signatories to this revolutionary document.
This document is now titled the Multilateral Agreement on Invest-
ment"' (hereinafter MAI) and is being constructed under the supervision
of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development11
(hereinafter OECD). The OECD had been considering the development
of a new multilateral investment framework, which would benefit all par-
ties who are signatories to the agreement. 12 The OECD has actively been
a catalyst for the liberalization of foreign investment since its founding,
but the MAI would be the first multilateral agreement that the organiza-
tion has completed. 3 The member states of the OECD were able to rec-
ognize the need for an agreement on investment, after experiencing the
growth and the constant need for increased foreign direct investment." '
110. MAI Agreement, supra note 3.
Ill- See OECD Web Page (visited Sept. 23, 1998) <http:www.oecd.org/about/member-
countries.html>. The OECD was established in 1961 as a forum for the discussion and at-
tempted coordination of the economic policies of the world's industrial democracies.
112. See Camponovo, supra note 7, at 182.
113. See id.
114. See OECD Web Page, OECD Member Countries (visited Sept. 23, 1998)
<http://www.oecd.org/about/member-countries.htrl>. (The OECD is primarily a developed
country organization. Its membership includes the following 29 countries: Australia, Austria,
Belgium, Canada, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hun-
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In order to address this need, the OECD ministers established a Ne-
gotiating Group at the OECD 1995 Ministerial meeting to begin negoti-
ating the MAI. The beginning of this process was of particular impor-
tance to the United States because of the numerous private investors from
the U.S. who participate through foreign direct investment."5 Other
OECD members are equally interested in the completion. Countries such
as France, Germany, Japan, the United Kingdom, along with the U.S.,
increased their outflows from $32 billion in the early 1980s to an esti-
mated $146 billion in 1993.116 It is these billions of dollars that the OECD
hopes to continue and increase with the implementation of the MAI.
The goals of the OECD in establishing the MAI, include liberaliza-
tion of investment measures, post-establishment investment protection
and an effective dispute settlement mechanism providing for both state-
to-state and investor-to-state disputes. 1 7 The OECD feels that the MAI,
in providing these protections, will foster the growth of foreign direct
investment. The need for foreign direct investment is greatest among
emerging economies to develop and improve the infrastructure.'18 It is
estimated by the World Bank that Asia alone will require $1.5 billion in
the next ten years. 9 The reality is that these funds will be unavailable
from public sources; only private investors will be able to provide the
needed amounts of capital.'20 In order to provide these funds, the private
gary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea, Luxembourg, Mexico, The Netherlands, New
Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the United King-
dom, and the United States).
115. United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Division on Transnational
Corporations and Investment, World Investment Report 1995, at 15 (1995). (In 1993 ap-
proximately $69 billion in capital flowed out of the United States into foreign markets, far
surpassing prior estimates which placed the amount of United States capital invested abroad
at $50 billion. The United Nations estimates the outflow of investment from the United
States to be $46 billion in 1994, approximately 23 per cent of global investment capital).
116. See id. (The United Nations expects this figure to decrease somewhat in 1996, esti-
mating the contribution of investment capital provided by these five countries to be $132
billion).
117. Communique of the Meeting of the OECD Council at Ministerial Level, at 3, OECD
Doc. SG/PRESS(95) 41 (1995) Robert Ley, The Multilateral Agreement on Investment:
Some Questions and Answers, OECD OBSERVER, Dec. 1996, at 28,29 (special edition for the
WTO Ministerial Conference explaining that high standards refers primarily to the quality of
the investment environment in terms of market access and legal security). [hereinafter Com-
munique].
118. Joanna R. Shelton, The OECD Web Page, (visited Sept. 23, 1998),
<http://www.cecd.org/daf/crmis/mai/shelton.htm>. (These remarks are from the keynote
address of the OECD Deputy Secretary-General Joanna R. Shelton at the Symposium on the
MAI, October 20, 1997 in Cairo, Egypt).
119. See id.
120. See id.
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investor would prefer a stable multilateral discipline guaranteeing for lib-
eral and non-discriminatory treatment, thus the MAI.12' The OECD in-
tends to address non-discrimination and treatment, through the familiar
principal of national treatment, that is established in bilateral treaties."
This national treatment is applied to both the pre-establishment and post-
establishment phases, thus protecting the investor. 3
The MAI will be of a freestanding international treaty with an exis-
tence separate from the other OECD instruments, and it will be open to
membership to all interested countries, both OECD members and non-
OECD members.2 4 The structure of the MAI will be composed of fun-
damental pillars of construction. These pillars of MAI will include the
definition of investment, obligation of the parties, and the dispute settle-
ment system. The definition of investment is at the core of the MAI
agreement, which is the intention of the OECD members. The OECD
intends to create a broad asset-based definition, covering not only direct
investment, but also includes portfolio investment. Both tangible and
intangible assets are to be covered under the MAI.126 The obligations of
the agreement contribute to the structural framework of the MAI and pro-
vide the needed stability when considering the complex issue of foreign
direct investment. These important obligations are to include national
treatment and most-favored nation provisions. 27 There has been intro-
duction of a special topic provision to be considered in the agreement,
which are based upon the results of other policies and their affect on indi-
vidual investors.12
Another important obligation provided for in the MAI is that of non-
121. See id.
122. See id.
123. See id.
124. See Burt, supra note 1, at 1041. (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Hong Kong, China, and
Slovakia are countries that are non-members of the OECD, but are seriously considering
being signatories of the MAI).
125. See May 1997 MAI Draft, supra note 3, at art. II § 2. ( Although the MAI will define
investment broadly, the May draft indicates that an interpretative note will be inserted into
the agreement to indicate that in order to qualify as an investment under the MAI, an asset
must have the characteristics of an investment, such as the commitment of capital or other
resources, the expectation of gain or profit, or the assumption of risk.) See also United States
Model Bilateral Investment Treaty, supra note 16. (Distinct from direct investment is portfo-
lio investment, over which the investor exercises no control. Although international invest-
ment agreements tend not to address portfolio investment, there is no universal consensus as
to the scope of Model Bilateral Investment Treaty considers intellectual property and rights
conferred under licenses and penits as protected investments).
126. See Communique', supra note 117, at 13. (Note that the MAI will use an asset based
definition versus a more restrictive enterprise based definition).
127. See Shelton, supra note 118, at 3.
128. See id.
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discrimination in privatization. This obligation includes the ability to
bring in key personnel and create equal rights for foreign investors to
compete for the ownership of state enterprises.' 29 The dispute settlement
system, as set forth in the MAI, is considered to be one of the strongest
parts of the agreement.
The scope of the MAI will include all forms of investment coming
from MAI investors."' The OECD intends to apply MAI discipline to all
sectors and to all forms of governments.'31 The establishment of enter-
prises and the activities of established foreign-owned or controlled busi-
nesses will be within the parameters of the MAI scope provision.'32 The
OECD is predicting that the MAI will extend beyond traditional foreign
direct investment to include portfolio investment and intangible assets.133
The possibilities include discussion on property rights, indirect invest-
ment, concessions, public debt and real estate.'34
The OECD has made it clear that the MAI is intended to provide
sweeping protection for investors and investment of signatory countries.
The investor and investment protection provision of the MAI was one of
the initial agreements of the negotiation sessions.'35 These provisions will
be similar to the standards of treatment for investments established in
BITs. 36 According to the OECD, the latest draft contains the following
elements: "(1) general treatment of the investor and the investments; (2)
expropriation and compensation; (3) protection from strife; (4) transfer of
funds; (5) subrogation; and (6) protection of existing investment."'37 The
MAI will closely resemble numerous BITs, as it was never the intention
129. See id.
130. See Report by the MAI Negotiating Group, May 1997, (visited Sept. 23, 1998),
<http://www.oedc.org/daf/cmis/maiIMAIRAP97.htm>. (This progress report was presented
by the MAI Negotiating Group to the OECD Council meeting at the Ministerial level in May
1997.) [hereinafter MAI Negotiating].
131. See Dr. Joachim Karl, The OECD Web Page, (visited Sept. 23 1998),
http://www.oeed.org/dafleymis/maiJKarl.htm. (From the comments of Dr. Joachim Karl, Fed-
eral Ministry of Economics, Germany at the Symposium on the MAI October 20, 1997 in
Cairo, Egypt. Dr. Karl was speaking on the topic of protection in investors and investment in
the MAI).
132. See MAI Negotiating, supra note 130, at 2.
133. See id.
134. See id.
135. See Multilateral Agreement on Investment: Progress Report by the MAI Negotiating
Group, OECD Doc. OECD/GDI(96)78 (1996).
136. See Burt, supra note 1, at 1049.
137. Karl, snpra note 131. (Discussions are going on of whether to include a provision
protecting the investor rights arising from individual contracts that have been concluded
between an investor and the host country. Furthermore, a final decision still has to be make
on how the MAI provisions on investment protection relate to the respective rules in other
agreements, e.g. the bilateral investment protection agreements).
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of the negotiators to 're-invent the wheel;' however, it was necessary to
add "more spokes in order to strengthen the whole vehicle."'38
The introductory article of general treatment provides that the MAI
will require that investment receive fair and equitable treatment as well as
full and constant protection with security.'39 The members have agreed
that the operation, and management, maintenance, use, enjoyment, or
disposal of an investment shall be protected."' There is still debate as to
these activities, considering if unreasonable and discriminatory state
measures shall be prohibited, or whether it is sufficient that these meas-
ures are either unreasonable or discriminatory.'' Supporters of this cu-
mulative approach felt it would go too far to prohibit measures that are
only unreasonable. 42 Those who are also against this new argument say it
would be too restrictive to cover only discriminatory measures because a
host country may severely interfere with the activities of an investor
without discrimination necessarily taking place. 43
The expropriation and compensation provisions are firmly estab-
lished in the MAI. The OECD members have declared that expropriation
is only permitted if its: 1) for a purpose which is in the public interest; 2)
non-discriminatory; 3) against payment of prompt, adequate and effective
compensation; 4) and in accordance with due process of law.'" One of
the questions to arise concerns what is compensation the investor can
claim in case payment has been delayed. 45 It was also decided that the
host country would pay the interest at a commercial rate established on a
market bases for the currency of payment from the date of expropriation
until the date of actual payment.'4 There has been some discussion on the
notion of including language to cover exchange rate risk on the amount of
compensation. 47
138. Id.
139. See id.; See also Burt, supra note 1, at 1045. (Treatment must in no case be less favor-
able than that required by international law.)
140. See Karl supra note 131.
141. See id.
142. See id.
143. See Dr. Joachim Karl, The OECD Web Page, (visited Sept. 23 1998),
<http://www.oecd.org/daf/cmis/mai/Karl.htm>.
144. See id. ( There is agreement on the following definitions: "prompt" means without
delay, "adequate" means that compensation must be fully equivalent to the fair market value
immediately before the expropriation takes place, without any deduction due to the fact that
the pending expropriation became publicly known in advance; "effective" means that com-
pensation shall be fully reliable and freely transferable; "due process of law" includes the
right of an investor to have its case reviewed by a judicial authority or any other independent
body in the host country). Id.
145. See id.
146. See id.
147. See id. (It is unclear whether an additional provisions according to which the host
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The protection from strife provision covers investors when they have
suffered losses in the host country due to war, any other armed conflict,
state of emergency or similar events."4 The host country will have an
obligation to compensate the investor in two situations: (1) in the case
that the armed forces of the host country requisition the property of the
investor; and (2) in the case that the armed forces of the host country de-
stroy the property (excluding any destruction necessary by the circum-
stances)." 49
Another major stabilizer of the MAI is the transfer of funds provi-
sion, which establishes that all currency related to an investment may be
freely transferred without delay.' The broad definition of payments in-
cludes: "initial capital, returns, compensation, proceeds from the sale or
liquidation of the investment, earnings and other remuneration of person-
nel."'' There are some points of debate for the members of the OECD,
which include: (1) a safeguard clause which would only be allowed in
exceptional circumstances (i.e., serious balance-cf-payment); (2) the cur-
rency in which transfers may be made; and (3) whether a clause is needed
dealing with the extension where there is no market rate of exchange.
5 2
Subrogation and protection of existing investment provisions are
equally important in the creation of the MAI. The subrogation provision
accepts the principle that if the home government compensates an inves-
country would also bear the exchange rate risk in the case of a delay. This means that in case
of a devaluation of the host country's currency between the time of expropriation and the
time of actual payment, the host country would have to compensate the investor for this
devaluation as well. After lengthy discussions the large majority supports the idea that the
MAI should not contain an explicit provisions on the subject. However, an interpretive
statement would be added to the text according to which adequate compensation includes
compensation for devaluation losses).
148. See id.
149. See Dr. Joachim Karl, The OECD Web Page, (visited Sept. 23 1998),
<http://www.oecd.org/daf/cnis/mai/Karl.htm>. (In principle, the host country shall not be
obliged to pay compensation in such cases. Rather, the Mai stipulates that if the host gov-
ernment decides to pay compensation, the principles of national treatment and most favored
nation treatment shall apply).
150. See id.
151. See id.
152. See id. (First any restriction has to be in conformity with the obligation of the host
country under the IMF Agreement. Furthermore, any restriction would be temporary, and
subject to review every six months. Second the two options for such a definition are currently
discussed. While the first alternative defines a "freely convertible currency" as one which is
widely traded tin international foreign exchange markets and widely used international trans-
actions, the second option refers to such a currency which is, in fact, widely used to make
payments for international transactions and is widely traded in the principle exchange mar-
kets. Thirdly it has been suggested that is such a situation, the rate to be used shall be the
most recent exchange rate for conversion of currencies into Special Drawing Rights).
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tor with regard to a loss it has occurred in the host country, the former
country enters into all rights and claims that the investor has, vis-a-vis the
host country.'53 The delegates agree in principal that the MAI should
cover investments, whether or not the investments were entered into be-
fore or after the complementary of the agreement.' 54
Discussion continues on the MAI regarding protection of investors'
rights from individual contracts involving the host country and the in-
vestor. The language of the provision may establish that each contracting
party respects any other obligation it has undertaken in an individual in-
vestment contract, with a specific investor.'55 According to the OECD,
there are currently three options receiving consideration: (1) the MAI
would not contain such a provision; (2) only the MAI dispute settlement
mechanism would be available in a breach of the contact; and (3) the
MAI would contain a respect clause, providing the possibility of recourse
through the MAI dispute settlement mechanism.'56
The most important aspect of the MAI for the individual investor is
the dispute mechanism. The members of the OECD intend to establish
the MAI as an agreement with high standards for the treatment and pro-
tection of investments.' 7 To ensure that the intentions are integrated into
the MAI, an effective dispute settlement mechanism has been established.
The dispute settlement provision provides for both state-to-state arbitra-
153. Id. (Two issues are still under consideration; first, a few delegations believe that the
provision should make it clear that it deals only with compensation of r non-commercial
risks. Second, one delegation has serious difficulties to allow the home country of the com-
pensated investor to proceed -as the latter's successor in rem - under the rules of investor-
state-arbitration).
154. See Karl, supra note 131. (Some delegations would like to add a provision to the
effect that the MAI does not apply to claims arising out of events which have occurred, or to
claims that have been settled, prior to its entry into force. Furthermore, some delegations
suggested yet another addition according to which a change in the form in which assets are
invested does not affect their character as investments.)
155. See Dr. Joachim Karl, The OECD Web Page, (visited Sept. 23 1998),
<http://www.oecd.org/daf/cmis/mai/Karl.htm>.
156. Id. (The main difference between the first and the second option on the one hand, and
the third option on the other had, would be that only in the latter case, the breach of the in-
vestment a contract by the host country would always amount to a violation of the MAI.
Consequently, the investor and its home country would be entitled to the remedies that the
Mai provides in such a case).
157. See Marino Baldi, The OECD Web Page, (visited Sept. 23, 1998)
<http://www.oecd.org/daf/cmis/mai/baldi4.htm>. (Ambassador Marino Baldi is the Deputy-
Director of the Federal Office of External Economic Affairs in Bern, Switzerland and the
Chairman of the Expert Group N-1 on Dispute Settlement and Geographical Scope. Ambas-
sador Baldi outlined these points at the Symposium on the MAI, October 20, 2997 in Cairo,
Egypt).
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tion and the increasingly important investor-to-state arbitration.'58 The
state-to-state dispute mechanism has little effect on the individual inves-
tor, because the investor stands little chance of ever receiving the national
support that is needed for such a claim. The investor-to-state dispute set-
tlement mechanism will be covered in greater detail, because of its direct
impact upon the investor.
The state-to-state arbitration provision is primarily composed of five
basic points.'59 The first follows the precedent set forth by the World
Trade Organization, which regains parties to resolve their dispute through
consultations.'" If the parties fail to come to an agreement, then at the
request of any of the contracting parties of the dispute, the dispute can be
submitted to an arbitration committee.' The second fundamental provi-
sion is that all arbitration panels will consist of either three or five mem-
bers.'62 The three members of the panel will be selected by the agreement
of the parties to the claim, based on a proposal made by the Secretary-
General of ICSID.'" Either of the parties to the dispute can choose the
five-member panel. If this avenue is pursued then each party will appoint
one additional member. 164
The third point allows the parties to a dispute to modify the rules, if
the parties to the action agree." The forth point establishes that the sub-
stantive law application of the MAI would be relied upon for disputes,
but international law and domestic law could be considered for certain
relevant situations."' The final pillar of the state-to-state arbitration pro-
vision, is that the awards issued by an arbitral panel would be final and
binding upon the parties to the dispute. 67 Remedies available to the state
include: a declaration that the action is in contravention of a provision of
the MAI; a pecuniary award; a recommendation that a party bring its
158. See Burt, supra note 1, at 1045, 1046.
159. See Baldi, supra note 157.
160. See id
161. See id.
162. See id.
163. See id.
164. See id. (This represents a compromise between those favoring an arbitrator being ap-
pointed by each of the two disputing parties, as in most bilateral investment agreements, and
those believing that a majority of non-party arbitrators is preferable for a multilateral agree-
ment, which should develop an institutional jurisprudence).
165. See Baldi, supra note 157. (If gaps in the MAI rules appear during a dispute and the
parties are not able to agree on supplementary rules, the PCA Optional Rules for Arbitration
Disputes between two state UNCITRAL rules serve as default rules).
166. See id.
167. See id. (An award shall be provided first to the parties as a draft to give them the op-
portunity to comment. This procedural safety valve should help to avoid aberrant decisions,
particularly with respect to question of fact).
[Vol. 6:195
INVESTENT TREATIES
measures into conformity with the MAI; or any relied to which the party
against who the award is made consents."
The vitally important investor-to-state arbitration provision is agreed
upon by the members and should provide the investor with the broadest
powers for taking a dispute directly against the breaching state."6 The
investor-to-state provision will borrow heavily from the previously dis-
cussed BITs. 70 According to the OECD, an investor may choose to sub-
mit claim for resolution: (1) to any competent court or administrative tri-
bunal of the contracting party to the dispute; (2) in accordance with any
dispute settlement procedure agreed on prior to the dispute arising; or (3)
under the procedures provided for by the MAI.17' The parties to the dis-
pute will consent to arbitration through adoption of the MAI agreement,
and thus be subject to either: (1) the ICSID rule of arbitration; (2) the
rules of the ICSID additional facility; (3) the UNCITRAL; or (4) the ICC
Court of Arbitration.'72 Included will be a provision for consolidating
multiple claims, thus giving investors whose claims are subject to con-
solidation the chance to agree on the nomination of arbitrators and on the
choice of the arbitration system. 173 The remedies available on the inves-
tor-to-state arbitration have broadened when compared with the state-to-
state remedies.'74 These available remedies include: a declaration when
the contracting party has failed to comply with its obligations under the
MAI; pecuniary compensation; restitution in kind; and with the consent
of the parties to the dispute, any other form of relief.'75 If restitution in
kind were unavailable due to practicality circumstances, then the party
would be able to substitute damages.'76
The MAI is a controversial agreement for a number of reasons in-
cluding national sovereignty, environmental concerns, and skepticism to
the accession of non-developed countries. There is concern that these
problems will limit the ultimate value of the MAI to the world economic
168. See id. (This may include restitution in kind).
169. See Burt, supra note 1, at 1046.
170. See Mauritz Lugard, Toward An Effective International Investment Regime, 91 AM.
SOC'Y INT'L L PROC. 485, 498. (This was a panel convened at 10:15 A.M., Saturday April
12, 1997. Mr. David H. Small offered an insiders perspective on the OECD negotiations,
with particular emphasis on the dispute resolution provisions of the MAI. Mr. Small is the
former Assistant Legal Advisor on Economic and Business Affairs at the State Department,
where he supervised all investment treaty negotiations. He currently serves as Deputy Legal
Counsel to the OECD in Paris, France).
171. See Baldi, supra note 157.
172. See id.
173. See Lugard, supra note 170, at 498.
174. See id.
175. See Baldi, supra note 157.
176. See Lugard, supra note 170, at 499.
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community.' The OECD often looks at foreign direct investment from a
biased perspective, because of its members, who are the developed coun-
tries of the world.' While there may be substance to the aforementioned
agreements, it cannot be dismissed that many countries throughout the
world need foreign direct investment. The implementation of the MAI
would provide the availability of capital, technology, managerial and
market skills, and information flows to host countries at unprecedented
levels. ' These resources would create opportunity for non-developed
countries to make up economic ground through these avenues.' ° The
contribution of foreign direct investment is crucial to capital formation,
but other benefits include: the promotion of local entrepreneurs and busi-
ness through backward and forward linkages; the enhancement of access
to foreign markets through the distribution networks of multinational en-
terprises and through facilitating exports by domestic firms; the promo-
tion of competition on the domestic market; and the modernization of
basic infrastructure services (such as in the areas of finance and telecom-
munications). 8' The OED has considered studies, in the creation of the
MAI, which address the policy environment that would be the most suc-
cessful in attractive foreign direct investment. 2 In looking at the various
studies, the OCED has concluded that open trade regimes are conducive
not only to attracting more foreign direct investment, but also to reaping
greater benefits from it than are closed trade regimes. 83
The concept that should be clear to the non-developed countries of
the world is that the capital that was once available from public sources is
no longer easily accessible. In order for non-developed countries to con-
tinue to improve their existence, they must pursue capital from previous
investors. Thus, in order to increase the amounts of capital available from
177. See Burt, supra note 1, at 1049.
178. See id.
179. See Adrian Otten, The OECD Web Page, (visited Sept. 23, 1998)
<http:www.oeed.org/daf/cmis/mai/ottenl.htm>. (Adrian Otten is the WTO Secretariat who
was speaking on the benefits of Foreign Direct Investment at the Symposium on the MAI,
October 20, 1997 in Cairo, Egypt).
180. See id.
181. See id. (In regard to the effect of foreign direct investment on the balance of payments,
the situation of course varies according to the type of foreign direct investment, but the over-
all situation that emerges from the studies is that foreign direct investment is generally asso-
ciated with an expansion of home country exports and can play an important role in their
diversification).
182. See id. (These include political and macro-economic stability, open and stable trade
and investment regimes, improvements in transport and telecommunications infrastructure,
adequate protection of property rights and a predictable institutional environment without
excessive red tape).
183 See id.
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private investors, these countries must agree upon a standard that is ac-
ceptable to the individual investor. The MAI goes far in providing the
necessary provisions and protections that many risk adverse investors
demand before making a financial leap of faith. This agreement assures
the investor of the ability to bind and enforce a contact with the state,
under the investor-to-state arbitration provision. The unavailability of
capital has, in effect, strengthened the bargaining position of the investor,
and perpetuated the creation of the investor friendly MAI. While the MAI
has yet to be implemented, it will eventually effect the ever-changing
world of foreign direct investment. The MAI is beneficial to the investor
in different respects, but leave no doubt that the beneficiaries will be the
citizens of the signatory parties to the agreement.
IV. CONCLUSION
Beginning with the FCN and continuing through the MAI, invest-
ment treaties have protected and elevated the international investor. The
evolution of the investment treaties has consistently improved the inter-
national business environment for the private investor, thus enabling the
investor to reduce risk and provide the necessary finances for develop-
ment. The evolutionary process of the investment treaty was introduced
by a series of agreements established in the Pre-North American Free
Trade Agreement phase. The first of these agreements, the FCNs, pro-
vided a solid foundation for investors. FCNs identified specific areas of
concern in international investment that would become cornerstones for
future agreements. While the FCNs value to the investor cannot be un-
derestimated, the agreement failed to address many of the modem inves-
tors' needs. The second agreement, the BIT, introduced the investor-to-
state arbitration mechanism, thus releasing the investor from reliance on
their state, in time of dispute. The GATT, the third agreement, failed to
substantially address investment until the Uruguay Round. One of the
improvements established in the GATT Uruguay Round was the inclu-
sion of intellectual property.
The second phase of this evolutionary process, the NAFTA agree-
ment, made substantial steps to empower the investor. The investor-to-
state dispute mechanism was the most comprehensive to date and has
since been the avenue followed for three precedent setting claims. Only
restricted to the signatory parties of Canada, Mexico and United States,
the NAFIA agreement provides the necessary treaty mold for the final
phase of the evolutionary process.
The third and most recent phase of the investment treaties is the
MAI. While the MAI is yet to be adopted, it will be unquestionably the
most comprehensive investment treaty. With the adoption of the MAI, the
investor of one of the current twenty-nine member countries would have
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access to unparalleled protections. Similar to NAFTA, the MAI investor-
to-state provision would extend the ability of the investor to take any of
the breaching parties to arbitration.
The initiation of the MAI and future treaties should continue to pro-
vide expanded opportunities for the international investor and the neces-
sary finances for expansion of the world economy. Expansion of the
world economy should promote political stability and an increased stan-
dard of living for the citizens of the international community.
